BORDER STRUGGLES IN THE MIGRANT METROPOLIS

Abstract
The transnational conjunctures of migration and urban space radically destabilise and contradict the spatial premises and conceptions of nationalism, and require us to examine the proliferation of sites of border enforcement far removed from physical borders at the territorial margins of states. The spatial practices of migrants and their struggles therefore provide crucial standpoints of critique from which to interrogate what we may call the ‘borderological’ fetishism of much border and migration studies. The migrant metropolis becomes the premier exemplar, simultaneously, of the extension of borders deep into the putative ‘interior’ of nation-state space through immigration law enforcement that increasingly saturates the spaces of everyday life, and of the disruptive and incorrigible force of migrant struggles that dislocate borders and instigate a re-scaling of border struggles as urban struggles.

Keywords
Migration • cities • urbanisation • transnationalism • space

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In this paper, I invite you to think with me about the intersections of transnational migration and urban space, and the profound ways that these dynamics are reconfiguring the politics of race, class, and citizenship. In part, I will refer to my previous ethnographic, historical, and socio-legal work on Mexican migration to Chicago (De Genova 1998, 2005; De Genova & Ramos-Zayas 2003). However, the general dynamics that I will sketch in this paper are in no sense confined to the ethnographic particulars or socio-historical peculiarities of the United States or any other specific ethnographic or historical example, as such. Rather, the primary concerns here are theoretical.

What is of interest for present purposes is thinking through some of the ways that a critical study of migration may have something significant to contribute to formulating a rigorously postcolonial approach to what, for better or worse, we have come to call ‘globalisation.’ The intersections of various migrations with particular cities or metropolitan regions allow us to approach this larger theoretical question from the particular vantage point of how migrants become involved in the production of distinct urban spaces. In short, migration provides an absolutely vital and indispensable critical lens on contemporary urban studies. However, it is likewise crucial to consider how a critical urban perspective is also vital for any migration studies that could be adequate to the conceptual task of situating transnational human mobility in its properly global configuration. In other words, migration studies research tends to be disproportionately urban in its empirical orientation, but commonly leaves the urban question profoundly under-theorised, if not utterly unexamined. In part, this shortcoming derives from the degree to which the study of migration has inevitably been framed by the border and immigration regimes of ‘national’ states, leaving the urban spatial setting of most migrants’ experiences and practices presupposed as merely the background ‘context’ for struggles that are politically articulated to the national scale. Nonetheless, with an insufficient conceptualisation of the urban, we risk contributing to the kind of migration studies that subordinates the study of migration and migrants’ struggles to the epistemic conceits and political prerogatives of one or another nationalism (De Genova 1998, 2005: 56–94, 2013b).

The spatial practices of migrants and their specifically urban struggles allow us to examine the proliferation of sites of border enforcement far removed from physical borders at the territorial margins of nation-states. These transnational spatial conjunctures therefore provide crucial standpoints of critique from which to interrogate what we may call the ‘borderological’ fetishism that often pervades border and migration studies. What I call the migrant metropolis becomes the premier spatial formation in which we witness the extension of borders deep into the putative ‘interior’ of nation-state space through immigration law enforcement that increasingly saturates the spaces of everyday life. Simultaneously, the migrant metropolis also epitomises the disruptive and incorrigible force of migrant struggles that dislocate borders and instigate a re-scaling of border struggles as urban struggles. Thus, the differential spaces produced at the intersection of migrant subjectivities and
historicities with specific urban locations challenge scholars in migration and border studies to fundamentally reconceptualise the emergent formations of social and political life, on a global scale.

Migrant mobilities provide a crucial pivot around which to problematise the enduring trap of methodological nationalism, which has so commonly plagued social scientific research (De Genova 1998, 2005: 56–94, 2013b; cf. Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2003). This is particularly true as political and juridical authorities configured at the ‘national’ scale of territorially defined states are set into dynamic tension with the urban or regional/metropolitan spatial scales where migrant social formations articulate transnationally with places that appear to be disconnected and remote. This insight is not particularly new, of course, as has informed much of the most innovative research on both migration and so-called ‘global cities’ since the 1990s (cf. Smith 2001). However, citizenship as well as the conventional politics of race and class has long been fundamentally elaborated within the purview of ‘national’ (state) sovereignty. Consequently, these tensions between the ‘national’ spatial scale of citizenship, ‘politics,’ and ‘the law’ and the substantive material and practical formations that conjure migrants and cities to more global socio-political processes remain the scene of a protracted crisis.

One hallmark of this crisis is the seeming paradox that, with accelerated and intensified ‘globalisation,’ we have witnessed a pervasive de-regulation of the cross-border flows of capital (in its diverse forms as investment, finance, and commodities), alongside the escalating re-regulation of human mobility, particularly in the form of migratory or refugee movements (Mitropoulos 2006: 7). Concomitantly, we have seen proliferation on a global scale of new formations of exclusion based on nativism (and ‘xenophobia’)(Anderson 2013; Appadurai 2006; Brotherton & Kretsedemas 2008; Carr 2012; Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Chavez 2008; Comaroff & Comaroff 2001; De Genova 2005: 56–94; Fekete 2009; Geschiere 2009; Mamdani 2001; Mbembe 2001; Murray 2011: 137–172; Perea 1997). With respect to contemporary migrations, a reanimated politics of expressly ‘national’ sovereignty has been widely articulated in terms of various formulations of a deeply racialised (if not avowedly racist) politics of citizenship (Balbair 1991; De Genova 2005, 2010c, 2013a; De Genova & Ramos-Zayas 2003; Gilroy 2012; Gulledstad 2002, 2006; Hervik 2004, 2011; Sharma 2008; cf. Modood & Werbner 1997; Pettigrew 1998; Silverstein 2005). Rather than perceive these struggles from the (effectively nationalist) epistemic standpoint of the migrant-receiving nation-state as problems of ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration,’ however, I take the intersections of migrant mobilities and the distinctive urban spaces they produce as sites for understanding some crucial aspects of this larger global crisis. Hence, my reflections here are part of an ongoing effort to conceptualise what I am calling the migrant metropolis as a rigorously transnational socio-spatial framework for comprehending the problems of migration, race, and citizenship, comparatively, on a global scale.

1 Of real and possible places

My concept of the migrant metropolis is addressed to formulating one kind of answer to David Harvey’s provocative question: *How can we dare to even think of future possible urban worlds?* (1996: 435).

Transnational migration is a central and constitutive dynamic in the contemporary social production (and transformation) of urban space. Let us briefly consider Europe. In spite of the denial of the notion that most of the European nation-states are now ‘countries of immigration,’ a denial that remains persistent in many quarters (Penninx et al. 2004), Europe has in fact become a complex and heterogeneous ‘immigration continent’ in ways previously unforeseen and still insufficiently understood (Penninx 2010). Three European cities are each home to more than two million foreign-born persons: London (3 million), Paris (2.8 million), and Moscow (1.8–2.8 million). Seven or eight European cities have populations that are more than 25% foreign born (and I want to underscore here that I am not counting the European-born children or grandchildren of migrants, who in some cases are officially classified as ‘foreigners’): London (37%), Geneva (listing 46% as ‘foreign-born’), Lausanne (listing 40%) Malmö (30%); Amsterdam (28%), Brussels (28%), Frankfurt (28%), and Rotterdam (26%). In addition, all of the following cities have populations in which foreign-born migrants comprise between 15% and 25%: Athens (17%), Barcelona (18%), Bonn (15%), Bordeaux (18%), Brescia (15%), Cologne (16%), Copenhagen (15%), Cork (15%), Dublin (20%), Dusseldorf (18%), Hamburg (16%), Madrid (16%), Mannheim (24%), Moscow (~20%), Munich (24%), Nice (18%), Nuremberg (17%), Oslo (24%), Paris (23%), Prato (17%), Salzburg (20%), Stockholm (20%), St. Petersburg (~15%), Stuttgart (23%), Vienna (20%), Zurich (22%). Furthermore, although the proportion of migrants to the total population is smaller, the following cities also count at least 100 thousand foreign-born migrants: Berlin, Birmingham, The Hague, Istanbul, Lyon, Manchester, Marseilles, Milan, Rome, and Toulouse. All told, there are more than 30 European cities with populations of which at least 15% is foreign born, and more than 40 European cities with at least 100,000 foreign-born migrants (cf. Benton-Short et al. n.d.; Price & Benton-Short 2008; Migration Policy Institute n.d.). (Admittedly, these figures are imperfect and misleading in one way or another, probably reflecting significant undercounts and, in any case, likely to be already outdated). Nonetheless, they confirm in general terms that the majority of major European metropolitan areas have been significantly impacted by migration. Furthermore, within any of these metropolitan regions, it is invariably possible to identify particular neighbourhoods or suburbs where the population is predictably more than half foreign-born, and in some instances where the degree of concentration (if not segregation) of migrants and their children is astounding higher.

In short, contemporary migrations are literally re-making cities, but I hasten to insist that this is not merely a banal fact of changing population demographics. Of course, we must be careful not to overstate the novelty of contemporary dynamics. As Alejandro Portes has recognised, ‘migration and the city can be viewed as two sides of the same coin, having built and accompanied each other’s development over the centuries leading to the contemporary global system’ (2000: 154). But we must nevertheless also guard against the familiar risk of assuring ourselves that there is nothing new under the sun. ‘The massive forced and unforced migrations of people ... a movement that seems unstoppable ...’ remarks Harvey, ‘will have as much if not greater significance in shaping urbanisation in the twenty-first century as the powerful dynamic of unrestrained capital mobility and accumulation’ (1996: 416; emphasis added). Indeed, the primacy of human mobility – the fact that it precedes and exceeds any regime of market-based capital accumulation or state-driven border regulation – is a central premise for the conceptual framework that emphasises the autonomy and subjectivity of migration. The transnational urban conjunctures that I want to consider to be instances of the migrant metropolis, therefore, genuinely challenge us to comprehend our global social, political, historical present in fresh ways. These transnational migrant urban formations are very much generated within the territorial boundaries and jurisdictions...
of nation-states, and in relation to the very palpable enforcement of nation-state space through immigration law and border policing. Nevertheless, they radically destabilise and contradict the spatial premises and conceits of nationalism. Thus, the *differential spaces* produced at the intersection of specific cities and migrant historicities invite us to fundamentally reconfigure the emergent formations of social and political life. So, if we dare to imagine that a different world is possible, how can we even *think* of future possible *urban* worlds?

Like Harvey and other prominent contemporary urban theorists (e.g. Brenner 2013; Brenner, ed. 2013; Merrifield 2005, 2014; Smith 2003), I have found the work of Henri Lefebvre to be deeply instructive. At the outset of his book, *The Urban Revolution*, Lefebvre posits an arresting hypothesis: ‘Society has been completely urbanised. This urbanisation is virtual today, but will become real in the future’ (1970b: 2003: 1). Although it was only published in English-language translation in 2003, this remarkable if still rather under-appreciated theoretical manifesto first appeared in print in 1970 (at a time when the great majority of humankind still inhabited places that could only be described as rural and agrarian). Lefebvre’s inquiries into the specificity of the *urban* notably insist on delineating a theoretical problem that goes beyond describing or cataloguing the positive empirical ‘object’ that may be construed of any particular city, as such. Indeed, he critically distinguishes what he calls ‘the urban’ from any quaint notions of ‘the city.’ Urban society, as Lefebvre formulates it, is therefore not just that which transpires in ‘cities,’ conventionally conceived; rather, while cities – and in particular, so-called ‘global cities’ – may serve as predominant nodes where wealth and power tend to be concentrated and commanded (Sassen 1991, 1994), urban society encompasses an effectively global fabric of material and practical as well as ideological and symbolic interconnections on a planetary scale. Thus, Lefebvre’s concept of an urban fabric that is not reducible to ‘cities’ as such opens up a productive theoretical framework for contemplating those interstitial spaces of mobility but also abjection that ‘make global cities (as commonly understood) possible and, hence, are internally connected to them’ (Isin & Rygjel 2007)

This conception of an incipient (and still virtual) global urban society was also a radically open-ended one. Lefebvre was intent to formulate hypotheses that could discern and apprehend the dynamism of vital potentialities that were still incomplete and unresolved – virtual but possible ‘objects,’ so to speak, which were as-yet still in the process of becoming and not mere ‘facts’ of the positivist sort.

Adopting Lefebvre’s methodological protocol for fashioning ‘objects’ of knowledge and inquiry grounded upon the as-yet incomplete possibilities and tendencies that can be discerned in actual social processes and spatial practices, I want to introduce the hypothesis of the *migrant metropolis*, as a still-incipient but nonetheless real (partially virtual, partially extant, and empirically verifiable) socio-political fact of global significance. In the global/urban society that seems plainly more self-evident today than 45 years ago when Lefebvre hypothesised it, is indeed the migrant metropolis that presents itself as the decisive lived spatial intersection where the contradictions of state power, ‘national’ sovereignty, and the juridical regulation of space (and people in space) are articulated with the global regime of capital accumulation. Consequently, the urban spaces deeply inflected by migrant practices have likewise become premier sites of *border* struggles.

The migrant metropolis is where both capital and territorially defined ‘national’ states must confront transnational labour as the premier manifestation of the sheer restlessness of human life itself, in its active (productive) relation to the space of the planet (De Genova 2010a, 2012). Subjected as it is to persistent efforts to manage mobility through immigration law, this elemental human freedom is ever increasingly confronted with the juridical illegalisation (De Genova 2002: 439, 2004: 173, 2005: 234) of various forms of mobility, and border enforcement regimes that make migrant labour exceptionally disposable by systematically rendering migrant life more or less *deportable*. Indeed, it is in these translational conjunctural spaces that we may best discern the active processes of what I like to call *inclusion through exclusion* (De Genova 2008, 2010b, 2010c, 2013a) that are central to producing new social orders of class, race, and citizenship inequalities and hierarchies.

Yet, the migrant metropolis has proliferated and flourished. Indeed, the resounding proclamation of the unprecedented migrant mobilisations that swept the United States in 2006 was a profoundly defiant claim, which I have previously characterised as a politics of incorrigibility: *Aquí estamos y no nos vamos, y si nos sacan, nos regresamos!* [Here we are, and we are not leaving! And if you throw us out, we will come right back!] (De Genova 2009, 2010d; cf. McNevin 2007; Nyers 2008; Walters 2008). Notably, beginning in October 2009, a wave of strikes by several thousand undocumented migrant workers demanding legal residence in France, articulated the themes of migrant presence and labour in remarkably similar terms; their principal slogan was: *On bosse ici, on vit ici, on reste ici!* [We work here, we live here, we are staying here!] (Barron et al. 2011). Similarly, since the Lampedusa in Hamburg collective emerged in 2013, one of their signature slogans has been: *We Are Here to Stay* (http://www.lampedusa-in-hamburg.org/; cf. Meret & Rasmussen 2014). These articulations of border struggles that erupt from the migrant metropolis are evidently claims of presence – enunciating the simple but insistent affirmation, ‘We are here’ – but above all, they operate as claims to space. Precisely in the face of the threat of deportation, forcible expulsion from the space of the state, they proclaim: ‘We are here, and we will not be ‘removed’! And in this simple but defiant gesture, the very ‘here’ that migrants invoke is always already a new and radically transformed one: ‘here’ we find ourselves in the migrant metropolis.

2 Transnational spatial conjunctures

There are, of course, many historically specific and socially particular manifestations of what I am calling the migrant metropolis. There is no single or singular paradigmatic instance. Indeed, there may often be multiple migrant metabolises that take shape even in a single city or metropolitan region. In purely empirical (demographic) terms, such metropolitan areas as Toronto, New York, or London, for instance, have been accurately enough depicted as ‘hyper-diverse’ (Price & Benton-Short 2008), prompting the rather more conceptually expansive but similarly descriptive and rather superficial (if not ideological) notion of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007). Just as there is no generic or universal ‘immigrant experience’ (De Genova 2005: 56–94), so there can be no generic migrant metropolis, no universal ‘immigrant experience’ of urban life. Nonetheless, if I have posited the concept of the migrant metropolis in the singular, it is because I hope to sketch the rough outlines of a theoretical lens through which to try to begin to see cities anew, and appreciate one of the more robust expressions of our global urban society (to use Lefebvre’s hypothesis). What must be emphatically clarified, however, is that the migrant metropolis ought not to be reduced to the trivial fact of
a mere physical presence of some migrants, of one sort or another, in a given city.

Based upon my ethnographic research conducted among Mexican migrants in Chicago during the mid-1990s, and theoretically assisted by Lefebvre’s conception (1974/1991) of the production of space, for instance, I have previously posited the idea of a Mexican Chicago (De Genova 1998, 2005). The point about Mexican Chicago was that it had to be apprehensible as a Chicago that could be said to meaningfully and substantively belong to Mexico, and thus, could be situated within Latin America – a Chicago that, even as it remained physically located within the territorial confines of the United States, had become elusive, even irretrievable to some extent, for the U.S. nation-state. For, here indeed was a Chicago that corresponded to the practical presents and imagined futures of countless communities throughout Mexico from which migrants originated, and in relation to which migrants continued in material and practical (as well as symbolic) ways to sustain an ensemble of social relations that exceeded, or even transcended, the nation-state border. The border that constitutes the premier division between the nation-state spaces of the United States and Mexico otherwise supplied the decisive and defining fault line across which, and through which, these transnational migrant trajectories and projects were actualised and achieved their socio-political and spatialised particularity. And yet, I contended, here was a Mexican Chicago – ostensibly confined within the boundaries of the U.S. nation-state, but also a site for their production. And here, by emphasising the production of those boundaries, which are always also limits, I proposed that Chicago likewise became a site of their contingency. In this way, we could understand the border to have imploded deep into the ‘interior’ of the country, but simultaneously, the border was thereby reconfigured. In Mexican Chicago and countless similar spaces, it became possible to see that the border was no longer merely a line that could be imagined to separate the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’ of a presumably integrated and unified national territory. Instead, the border had effectively been folded in upon itself, compressed, perforated and tangled, ruptured and scattered. As lived in Mexican Chicago, the border had become a kind of fractalised and always mobile proliferation of tentative boundaries and border zones where the alienage of migrants could be localised but never strictly confined or contained. When the border materialised in this space, it tended to be localised on migrants’ bodies. In effect, they wore the border on their faces, carried it on their backs. That is to say, the ‘national’ border was now re-articulated as an everyday marker of racialised class distinction, racial discrimination and segregation.

Yet, none of this was simply the effect of any one-sided, unidirectional strategy of control. If the nation-state border had been fractured and fragmented and riddled with unforeseen complexity, this was the direct consequence of the autonomy and subjective energy of migrants themselves. Undocumented migrants’ subversions of the border were not simply a one-time event on the occasion of their physical crossings of the territorial border. Likewise, for those who were ‘legal’ (or had been ‘legalised’), their enduring status as non-citizens ensured that the border continued to shape and constrain the conditions of possibility for their efforts to go about making their lives and livelihoods. Thus, the diverse border struggles in the migrant metropolis constituted a whole way of life thoroughly ensnared in migrants’ bordered ‘inclusion’ or ‘incorporation’ as labour into everyday life within the space of the United States.

Migrants, I suggested, were producing a conjunctural space with transformative repercussions in all directions, and some aspect of Chicago itself had thereby become radically disarticulated from the assimilatory powers of U.S. nationalism and the containments of its presumably sacrosanct and inviolable space. The force of my intervention was directed specifically against the epistemic stability of the U.S. nation-state as a presupposition, and the hegemony for immigration discourse and politics of the concomitant teleology of ideological notions such as ‘integration’ or ‘assimilation.’ However, this did not make Mexican Chicago easily recuperable for the Mexican nation-state, much as various projects of the Mexican state and its dominant political parties sought to reincorporate and domesticate its so-called diaspora. Rather than an outpost or mere extension of the Mexican nation-state, then, the ‘Mexican-ness of this other Chicago – this migrant metropolis – was itself something new that emerged only from the veritable encounter and engagement of Mexican-origin labour migrants with the racialised social order and political economy of the United States. The migrant metropolis, therefore, is meant to signal the vital possibility of something truly new, a radically differential social formation. Mexican Chicago, as a migrant metropolis, was thus posited also as a standpoint of critique.

Mexican Chicago is not a ‘place’ in any positivist sense, even in spite of the existence of numerous virtually homogeneous (segregated) ‘Mexican’ neighbourhoods and suburbs. Instead, Mexican Chicago was produced more negatively than positively, which is to say, it emerged relationally. Its growth and development could be analysed in relation to various social processes and spatial practices, deeply grounded in the practical productive activity and creative energies of real people immersed in a complex ensemble of social relations, simultaneously located within the metropolitan region of Chicago and also operating transnationally in ever-proliferating circuits that were oriented around otherwise seemingly remote locales across much of the geography of Mexico. Mexican Chicago was (and continues to be) a real space, but it was (and is) nonetheless not reducible to any particular place, not a delimited migrant ‘ghetto’ or ‘ethnic enclave,’ not a putative ‘village in the city,’ not some sort of quasi-discrete virtual ‘island’ within the confines of a larger urban space that otherwise could be assumed to thoroughly encompass and contain it. Instead of an enclosure, the proposition of a Mexican Chicago signified a radical and disruptive opening, and upon the more prosaically known and conventionally knowable space of the city, it superimposed another (other) metropolis.

3 An ‘alien’ metropolis

The migrant metropolis is indeed an ‘alien’ metropolis – one subjected to a systemic kind of alienation, one of pronounced exploitation and protracted estrangement, for the migrants themselves. But the migrant metropolis likewise becomes a screen for the phantasmatic projection of a beleaguered or even besieged sense of nativist prerogative, now alienated from its own supposed birthright entitlements. Against the onslaught of this sort of nativist politics of identity and entitlement, the migrant metropolis is plainly a racialised (indeed, a racially subordinated) metropolis. Contemporary debates over migration are deeply riven by racial meanings, even when they are conducted in the ostensibly race-neutral language of the politics of citizenship or supposedly ‘insurmountable cultural difference’ (Balibar 1991: 22), whereby the category of ‘immigration’ itself has come to serve as a routine proxy for race (Balibar 1991: 21; cf. De Genova 2010c; Gilroy 2012). Furthermore, it is the figure of the urban as such that signals a whole complex discursive terrain and a still more convoluted subterranean realm of more murky motivations, impulses, and anxieties. Again, the migrant metropolis ought not to be understood as a communal space of ‘displacement’ and ‘transplanted’ or
dislocated ‘culture.’ Rather, it is constituted materially and practically by the intersections of global capital, transnational (migrant) labour, territorially-defined ‘national’ state formations and their unequal politics of citizenship and entitlement, and the postcolonial dynamics of racialised inequalities. While all of these forces are configured at a global level, it is on the level of the nation-state that the whole panoply of tactics of immigration law enforcement and techniques of border policing are brought to bear upon migrants. In this respect, the migrant metropolis tends to always also be a border zone (cf. Isin & Rygiel 2007; Isin & Siemiatycki 2002; McNevin 2007). In this critical light, in order to adequately confront and subvert the nativism and nationalism that plague our contemporary politics of immigration and citizenship, we must reckon simultaneously with a global (postcolonial) politics of race and a comparably global (neoliberal) politics of transnational labour mobility, both of which are very much ‘at home,’ so to speak, in the migrant metropolis, incubated and flourishing both within and against the borders of nation-states. As a site for the veritable production of new formations of racialised difference, the migrant metropolis is – in each and every distinct instance – a historically specific conjuncture of unresolved postcolonial tensions and conflicts, reconfigured as a special kind of setting where the global relation of labour and capital acquires its substance and density as a tentative and tenuous configuration of the politics of class, race, and citizenship.

And yet, the migrant metropolis must be apprehensible, nevertheless, as produced at least in part by the autonomy and subjectivity of migrants as a platform for optimising their own capacities and advancing their own projects – a differential space, in short, fundamentally elusive for any regime of citizenship and perhaps ultimately irretrievable for any nationalism. The critical analysis of the migrant metropolis, then, by re-situating our understandings of the mutually constitutive intersections of migration and urbanisation as socio-political facts of global scope, may offer us a critical lens through which to appreciate and better apprehend how the autonomy and subjectivity of migrants supply a vital motive force for the ongoing reconstitution of our global (urban) society. The sheer force and vitality of migrant mobilities is remaking space at every scale – from the most localised sense of neighbourhood to the global scale of complex transnational regions and trans-continental mega-regions configured by migrant trajectories and the new ensembles of social relations that migrants sustain. In radical contradiction with the securitised and militarised border regimes of nation-states, but always also intricately articulated through the multiple and necessarily semi-permeable force fields of these border regimes, the migrant metropolis has emerged as a crucial spatial form for reformulating the relationship of the human species to the space of the planet.

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**Notes**

2. In a manner that is insufficiently attentive to the constitutive contradictions between ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’ under capitalism, James Hollifield designates this tension ‘the liberal paradox: the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure’ (2004: 193).
3. Very notably, this has been the case not only with regard to migrant ‘foreigners’ but also toward minoritised fellow citizens who may be recast as virtual or de facto ‘foreigners’ – indeed, ‘enemies’ – within the space of the nation-state.
4. Because statistics include most of the Swiss-born children and grandchildren of migrants as officially classified ‘foreigners,’ the numbers are ambiguous.
5. Likewise, other, less populous cities (for which the gross numbers are smaller), such as Bergen and Bonn are also significant migrant destinations, with the foreign-born accounting for more than 10% of their populations.
7. Lefebvre was unapologetic in this regard; as he explains, ‘There is no theory that neither explores a possibility nor tries to discover an orientation’ (1970a/2009: 178).
8. Similarly, Sandro Mezzadra has developed the parallel concept of ‘differential inclusion’ (2006, 2011; cf. Mezzadra & Neilson 2012, 2013). With regard to undocumented migrants, Martina Cvajner & Giuseppe Sciortino add a noteworthy twist to this concept by characterising it bluntly but persuasively as ‘inclusion at a higher price’: ‘As a matter of fact, many migrants acquire significant resources through market channels: … higher rent … lower salary or more flexible schedules … fake documents or fiscal numbers for a fee.… Markets evaluate migrants as economic opportunities: if their irregular status deters some providers, it induces others to exploit the differential chances for economic gain’ (2010: 400).
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