The European Question

Migration, Race, and Postcoloniality in Europe

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What is "Europe"? Who is a "European"? These questions ordinarily go unasked. To ask these questions—which I enfold together as the European question—is to identify a problem that is both epistemic (geographic, historiographical, ethnographic) and political. The pioneering African American intellectual W. E. B. Du Bois famously articulated the "ever unasked question" routinely posed implicitly to black Americans: "How does it feel to be a problem?"[1] The question's pertinence for presumptively true Europeans now also becomes apparent: each national identity has become newly problematic. This is greatly due to the extent to which these presumptively self-evident, fundamental national identities have been destabilized in unprecedented and unforeseen ways by the mere presence and lived practices of migrants and their progeny.[2] Moreover, that broader, more encompassing figure—Europeanness—is once again an elusive master signifier, perennially plagued with ambiguities and uncertainties even as its salience seems ever more pronounced.[3]

Today all of Europe is newly obsessed with its identity. In this regard, the long-standing German obsession with self-interrogation in the aftermath of the Holocaust—whether sincere, cynical, or evasive—is simply the exception that proves the rule.[4] Notably, from the outset of the (post–Cold War) era of European integration, Étienne Balibar has posed various iterations of what I am calling the European question, in emphatic relation to migration and racism:

> The official image—I am now tempted to say the official myth—on which we ourselves lived for many years was that such definitions of Europe and Europeanness were possible in principle. . . . No one really hesitated about

the reference of the word "Europe." . . . this reference simply went with-
out saying: the real problem concerned "migrations" and "racism." Now
everything has changed and the opposite is the case. Before there can be
any serious analysis of racism and its relationship to migrations, we have
to ask ourselves what this word "Europe" means and what it will signify
tomorrow.[5]

With markedly less interest in questions of migration and racism, endors-
ing an unabashed (albeit purportedly leftist) Eurocentrism, Slavoj Žižek
argues likewise: "One should repeat the question 'What is Europe?' or
rather, 'What does it mean for us to be Europeans?,' and thus formulate a
new inception."[6] Similarly, explicitly invoking the question of European
identity, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida argue that a persuasive
"'vision' for a future Europe . . . must articulate itself."[7] In the extended
aftermath of the end of the Cold War and especially now, amid the shocks
of global capitalist crisis, the European question has become a problem of
a new significance and magnitude—above all, in Europe itself.

Social movements during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were pressed to address various political problems in terms, for example,
of the Jewish Question (or, in the United States, the Negro Question) or
the National Question; thus they approached these questions from the
unexamined standpoint of relative privilege. In the twenty-first century,
these famous questions have been succeeded in Europe by the Migration
Question.[8] Thinking critically about migration in Europe today, how-
ever, as Balibar contends, requires that we first reckon more deliberately
and conscientiously with what is really at stake: the problematization of
Europe and Europeanness as such.

If Europe presents itself now as a question (indeed, a problem) for
Europeans, this is still more true in Europe's increasingly amorphous
externalized border zones.[9] There is no stable space of Europe toward
which the figure of migration can be understood to move, as from an
imagined periphery toward a fixed center. Remarkably, we appreciate this
best from the standpoints of the migrants and refugees themselves. Con-
sider, for instance, the Tunisian migrants after the 2011 revolution who,
on their arrival in Italy, subjected to the mandates of the European border
regime, proclaimed indignantly that they had no desire to remain in Italy
and wanted instead to go to *Europe*.[10] Here we are reminded that there is
no such monolith as Europe, that much of Europe comes up short of the
gleaming ideal of "Europe" as an obscure object of desire.

Yet for centuries, and still today—in the wake of orientalism, trans-
atlantic slavery, colonialism, the Cold War, and European integration—
Europe has been the recurrent name for a heterogeneous variety of dis-
crepant projects that have persistently upheld the putative identity and

integrity of Europe as a more or less monolithic projection.[11] Indeed, if Europe remains an abstraction, it is crucial all the same to recognize it as a real abstraction, produced and continuously sustained by sociopolitical relations. We may even posit that in the era of the European Union, with its political, economic, juridical, and institutional project of European integration and harmonization, this real abstraction of Europe is perhaps more real than ever before. Nonetheless, it remains deeply contradictory and fundamentally incoherent.

The ramifications *within* Europe of its increasingly blurred (external) boundaries have prompted Balibar to detect that Europe is indeed one big borderland.[12] Furthermore, invoking Dipesh Chakrabarty, Sandro Mezzadra argues: "Movements and struggles of migration in Europe . . . are displacing and de-centering Europe on the level of everyday life. They are provincializing it."[13] Nevertheless, the agonistic problematization of European identities largely continues to arise only in refracted ways, by way of vexed discourses of "migration" and murkier preoccupations with the (migrant) "foreigners" themselves.[14] It is indeed around this Migrant Question, or problem, that most migration research is arranged. Surely a predictable variety of analytic (but deeply normative and politicized) categories regarding migrant integration and migration management have begun to be subjected to a fair measure of critique. But . . . what *is* Europe? *Who* is a European? These are questions that have been left insufficiently interrogated. They concern us in profound, indeed intimate, ways.

Admittedly at the risk of polemical excess, I offer this essay as a provocation. Its purpose is precisely to provoke critical reflection on what is most readily naturalized and presupposed in contemporary European (cultural) politics, namely, the very self-evidence and transparency of the notion of Europe itself, and the full gamut of contradictory desires and motivations in European identity politics. Indeed, following Du Bois, it is incumbent on us to ask, how does it feel for Europeanness to be a problem? This ever unasked question haunts our contemporary European sociopolitical scene. "The starting point of critical elaboration," Antonio Gramsci suggests, "is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory."[15] As Edward Said extrapolates, "It is important therefore to make an inventory."[16]

Such an inventory commands that we interrogate European racial denial, disavowal, and dissimulation in the aftermath of the Holocaust. For David Theo Goldberg, the European intellectual and political context has become exemplary of "what happens when no category is available to name a set of experiences that are linked . . . to racial arrangements and

engagements . . . a case study in the frustrations, delimitations and injustices of political racelessness."[17] Specifically referring to the presumptive elision of the analytic concept of race with the essentialist conceits of racism, and the pervasive reduction of any question of racism in European contexts to the historical experience of the Holocaust, Goldberg demonstrates how "Europe's colonial history and legacy dissipate if not disappear."[18] Sanctimonious desires to renounce race as a residually racist article of faith, in other words, supply the dubious pretexts for an astounding postcolonial historical amnesia. Or, as Ann Laura Stoler argues persuasively (considering France), this condition may be better named "colonial aphasia," involving "an occlusion of knowledge . . . a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things . . . and, most important, a difficulty comprehending what is spoken."[19] This postcolonial aphasia is not unrelated, notably, to what Stoler elsewhere depicts as imperial dispositions of evasion and disregard.[20] Banishing race as an analytic category, that is, risks forsaking any adequate account of the colonial legacies that literally produced race as a sociopolitical category of distinction and discrimination.

Thinking with Du Bois (an intellectual contemporary of Gramsci, after all), the stakes of my provocation likewise concern an overdue reckoning with what Europe may yet learn about itself—particularly regarding the politics of race and postcoloniality—through an engagement with an almost completely unrecognized or disavowed (African) American interlocutor.[21] While in no way exhaustive in itself of the possible modes of interlocution between Europe and the American experience, this gesture may be indicative nonetheless of the promise of still more fundamental reckonings of Europe's racial condition in light of the indispensable example of its American counterpart.[22] Such an endeavor can only be suggested here. This task may commence, however, by examining Europe from the critical standpoint of migration and the racialized perplexities of the migrants who are literally making Europe anew.

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Whether in good conscience or bad faith—honestly, cynically, or with clumsy dissimulation—all of Europe is increasingly preoccupied by the Migration Question, seemingly bewildered about why all these migrants should come crashing the gates of what was supposed to be an idyllic preserve for the exclusive enjoyment of a distinctly European patrimony. In response to the hegemonic entrenchment of the Migration Question, therefore, we must critically posit the European question from the vantage point of the cross-border mobility of migrants and in light of the enduring "coloniality of power" that contemporary borders imply.[23] In the wake of

decolonization on a global scale, coupled now with many decades of transnational, intercontinental, postcolonial migrations that are the harvest of empire, Europeans today—like Germans confronting the Nazi past—are forced to contemplate the legacies of Europe's historical crimes. This indeed is what is implied when Balibar, referring to the "recolonialization" of migration and the concomitant racialization of contemporary globalization, proposes as indispensable "the question of the colonial heritage and its permanence."[24] "Once the Colonial Border has definitely ceased to organize an entire geography," contend Sandro Mezzadra and Federico Rahola, "it virtually proliferates everywhere, reproducing itself on the apparently smooth surface of the global present."[25] Notably, this is as true for European countries that did not preside over colonial empires as it is for those that did. Today in Sweden, to take one prominent example of a prosperous country widely considered innocent of any colonial history (despite having annexed neighboring Finland from medieval times until 1809), the second-largest foreign population (after Finns, not surprisingly) consists of Iraqi refugees who arrived only following the US-perpetrated war in 2003.[26] Evidently reaping part of the dispersed repercussions of US invasions and neocolonial occupations that uphold what Derek Gregory aptly calls "the colonial present," rather than ensuing from a directly colonial past, the "colonial border" is now truly unmoored and "proliferates everywhere."[27] Hence in 2013 Sweden assumed its place alongside France and Britain when riots erupted in migrant neighborhoods against racist police brutality in a segregated Stockholm suburb.

Much as the Migration Question in Europe is always already (at least implicitly) a racial question,[28] the European question identifies Europeanness itself as a racial problem—a problem of postcolonial whiteness.[29] As Salman Rushdie once sardonically affirmed in the aftermath of the 1981 riots in Britain, in a rather forthright reply to Du Bois's ever unasked question: "You talk about the Race Problem, the Immigration Problem, all sorts of problems. If you are liberal, you say that black people have problems. If you aren't, you say they are the problem. But the members of the new colony have only one real problem, and that problem is white people. . . . Racism, of course, is not our problem. It's yours. We simply suffer from the effects of your problem."[30] How, then, may we examine anew the problem of European identity and the contradictory and competing productions of a European space as racial formations and racial projects? This, I contend, is the ever unasked question always posed implicitly whenever the topic of migration arises in contemporary European contexts. Indeed, when African migrant farm workers in the southern Italian town of Rosarno were recurrently subjected to racist terror, culminating in rioting in 2010, articulations of both sides of the conflict confirmed that it was not as migrants, foreigners, or even Africans that

they were targeted with violence: they were being persecuted as *blacks*. And the overtly racial category of blackness requires that we interrogate its (always at least implicit) counterpart: whiteness. In Italy, however, the matter was perfectly explicit: following the pogrom, one local politician promptly proclaimed Rosarno the world's only all-white town.[31]

Whereas, historically, the National Question in Europe concerned the emancipation of subordinated minorities, today the problems of national identity, national culture, national values, and national sovereignty present themselves primarily as majoritarian projects. This presumptive prerogative of the (national/native) majority, furthermore, is principally articulated in relation to migration, if not plainly against migrants.[32] The national question thus reasserts itself in Europe as a variety of profoundly racialized projects of anti-immigrant nativism,[33] from which there is of course no immunity for the native-born European children and grandchildren of migrants of decades past, often permanently inscribed as being "of migrant background" or indefinitely categorized (sometimes, juridically) as (noncitizen) "foreigners." From the perspective of migration and the new Europeans of color,[34] what is the specificity of, for instance, the Greek problem, or the British problem? The fascistic paramilitary operations of Golden Dawn in Greece and the comparatively feckless thuggishness of the English Defence League are clearly distinct sociopolitical phenomena, but how substantially different are these manifestations of the new European nativist politics of national identity from the standpoint of those targeted as the objects of their contempt—from the standpoint, in other words, of those whom they seek to terrorize? How different are they, really? Despite their ostensibly nationalist militant particularisms, each European nativist movement from one country to the next is remarkably similar to the rest. In each we find a composite formation conjoining nationalist peculiarities with (European) racial whiteness. The historical specificity and distinct sociopolitical (national) composition of each notwithstanding, we surely must also ask: What is the shared foundation of these new nativisms, and how does this reveal the postcolonial condition of Europe as such, more generally? Tellingly, among various nationally identified offshoots of the English Defence League, there has also arisen the European Defence League. Are we indeed confronting what Balibar has anticipated as "a specifically 'European' racism"?[35]

One rather dramatic manifestation of these new formations of European identity is apparent in the ideology that motivated Anders Breivik's bloodbath in Norway, principally targeting white Norwegians in a fury of racial sanitation. As enunciated in Breivik's manifesto, tellingly titled "A European Declaration of Independence," a far-right nationalist project of racial whiteness, castigating multiculturalism, explicitly upheld its specifically anti-Muslim racism with an image of pan-European commu-

nity affiliated with the premodern notion of Christendom.[36] Despite this recourse to a veritable neomedievalism, the historical specificity of our present crisis is clearly distinguished by the irruption of Breivik's project within the now routinized rubric of the so-called Global War on Terror, protracted neocolonial military occupations in predominantly Muslim countries, and the dramatic escalation of securitization generally.[37] Regardless of antiterrorist pretexts and pretenses, these security state measures figure migration in general (and other forms of cross-border mobility) as principal targets.[38] Nonetheless, Muslim migrants in particular have indisputably borne an inordinate burden of suspicion and hostility during recent years.[39]

If the more generic derision toward foreigners advances one variety of specifically anti-Muslim racism, however, the very category "Muslim" also tends to be conflated with a whole racialized class constellation. Hence Houria Bouteldja, spokesperson for the Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR) in France, unpacks the contemporary Muslim Question in Europe:

> I would even say that "Muslim" also denotes "resident of a poor neighborhood." It is sometimes a euphemism for "banlieue." Its meaning is pejorative. . . . In France, Islam is above all a religion of the poor and of immigrants and therefore of a part of the population that has no political, economic or media power. . . . The white European identity that dominated the world for 500 years is in decline. The voices—often hysterical—raised in the media against Islam fundamentally express a fear of this decline. . . . Whites are losing their historical centrality . . . and they see all these non-Whites, wrongly identified with Islam, as a threat to their identity.[40]

Thus, as a category, "Muslim" condenses both racial and class derision, encompassing nonwhite "foreigners" who may not even be Muslims. So the European question—particularly regarding the crisis of European prestige and prosperity—entails a persistent conflation of migration, race, and Muslim identity as relatively floating signifiers for the intrinsically contradictory mediation of the contemporary, protracted postcolonial agony.

Even in eastern European countries where migration is comparatively negligible, national identity is commonly posited against various figures of effectively racialized foreignness. In Hungary the far-right populist party Jobbik resuscitates the racial specter of "the Jews" and propagates notions of the danger of Jewish (Israeli) foreign investment. In Bulgaria the far-right nationalists of Ataka (Attack Party) resuscitate the menace of "the Turks," alleging Turkey's designs to recolonize the country by financing mosques for Bulgaria's significant (Muslim) Turk minority. Whereas the Swiss People's Party mobilized voters in 2009 with

an Islamophobic referendum against the construction of new minarets in a country where the Muslim Question and the Migration Question are inextricably entangled, a different but analogous majoritarian politics in Bulgaria similarly seeks to capitalize on anti-Muslim racism in a context where "the Muslims" are ostensibly conationals and fellow citizens. Thus, even in the absence of specifically migrant racial alterity, contemporary European politics tends to involve a reframing of the national question as a racialized one, deeply anxious about various "foreign" menaces.

The ideological short-circuit affiliating "the Muslim" with migration (and hence foreignness) is in no sense coincidental. As Gil Anidjar argues persuasively, the Jewish question and the Muslim question were always coconstituted but signaled figures of alterity presumed to be, respectively, internal and external to Europe, the former as a theological enemy, the latter as a political one.[41] We can add that the internal menace was figured as a *corrosive* one, whereas the external threat was always perceived as an *invasive* one.[42] Recent European obsessions with "home-grown" (second-generation Muslim) terrorists notably conflate the two figures perfectly. Similarly, European Muslim national identities, such as Bosnian or Chechen, come to demarcate racialized liminal figures, oddly located in the unstable borderlands of Europe but simultaneously in the greater orbit of Turkey as a long-entrenched orientalized other haunting perhaps the most extreme and enduring border of Europe.[43] Furthermore, inasmuch as the racialized figure of "the Muslim" has been hyperbolically affiliated with the anomic aggression and fanatical violence of "foreigners" (whether internal or external), this monstrous menace comes to stand for death itself—"the fear of violent death, the paranoia of Europe's cultural demise . . . the fear of the death of Europe itself."[44]

However, beyond the violent outbursts and fascistic movements that have been steadily advancing and normalizing a more broadly anti-immigrant agenda, we must also interrogate the normative nationalist complacencies of liberal and left political frameworks, including some varieties of would-be critical migration studies and antiracist movements that leave intact the assimilationist presuppositions of the politics of integration. Many European states themselves avow a putatively antiracist universalism, but these official ideologies systematically promote a Eurocentric variety of secularism that equates a distinctly European or Western civilization with universalism, which is routinely mobilized to accuse migrants of parochialism and fundamentalism.[45] Thus "European" values are juxtaposed with "foreign" ones, universalism becomes one more militant particularism, and the demand for compulsory integration becomes a ruse that polices, penalizes, and disciplines migrants' alleged foreignness. This ideological hypocrisy is denounced in the founding Call of the French movement that culminated in the creation of the PIR: "Under

a term of 'fundamentalism' never defined, the populations of African, Magrhebian or Muslim origin are now identified as the fifth column of a new barbarism that threatens the West and its 'values.'"[46] As PIR spokesperson Bouteldja argues, for those racialized as Muslim, secularism gets converted into "a weapon against us."[47] Ultimately, such proclamations of pronouncedly European universalism affirm the opposite: a pluralistic, relativistic conception of essential cultural incompatibility (and by implication the impossibility of migrant assimilation). After decolonization, such projects may now be less sanguine about their global "civilizing missions," but they reassert their self-satisfied derision toward migrant difference and revitalize supremacist pretensions of an identitarian politics of national/European prerogative.

Regarding the postcoloniality of Europe today, it is productive to consider the profound radicality of the PIR. The PIR plainly represents one sort of interlocutor for Europe, and its members are not reticent about asking—and answering—the European question. Predominantly native-born citizens of France—(so-called second- or third-generation) youth of color—the PIR members proclaim themselves *indigènes* (indigenous), a term of French colonial provenance referring to colonial subjects, indeed, colonized natives. Compelled to live the experience of colonial racism within France, despite ostensible citizenship, they provocatively declare themselves the republic's colonized natives. Thus they repudiate the treacherous egalitarian promise of citizenship itself, denounce their postcolonial racial subjugation, and call for "the decolonization of the Republic."[48] Their principal slogan, "Le PIR est avenir!," is a remarkable double entendre. Literally, it proclaims, "The PIR is the future!"—announcing the political coming of age of French-born youth of color and boldly claiming their own postcolonial entitlement to define the future of France. More directly, however, the slogan simultaneously asserts its customary idiomatic sense: *Le pir est avenir* means "The worst is yet to come!" Playfully destabilizing all the encrusted ideological conceits of French republican color-blindness while forcefully indicting the racial complacencies of the French (white) Left, the PIR unapologetically rejoices in its own insurgent, incorrigible audacity. Here are the new Europeans, indeed!

Whether the European question manifests in a resurgence of nationalist particularism or universalistic secularism, therefore, we detect the contemporary discourses and practices of Europeanness to be distinctly postcolonial racial projects. "The object of postcolonial critique," Achille Mbembe reminds us instructively, "is best described in terms of *the interlacing of histories and the concatenation of distinct worlds*."[49] Indeed, the supranational institutional configuration of a new Europe, under way since the first decade of the Cold War in the form of the European Economic Community, is apprehensible only in terms of a historically prior,

comparably supranational formation of European community. That earlier version of Europe and its concomitant European identity were predicated on Europe's colonial relation to the globe,[50] on the material and practical basis of a global regime of white supremacy.[51]

Here, after all, lest we need reminding, we are speaking precisely of *Europe*. What is this place called Europe? How did the dominant European nation-states come about, historically? What was the material basis of European wealth and aggrandizement? We may affirm without reservations that the foundation of specifically *European* prestige and prosperity for centuries was precisely colonial empire. Across this long and sordid colonial history, the overwhelming majority of Europe's laboring classes did not live in Europe but inhabited the vast expanse of colonies across Africa, Asia, and the Americas.[52] Subsequently, however, as Mbembe argues for France, so also for other European imperial powers in the wake of their postcolonial demise: each withdrew into the narrow epistemic confines of its presumptive national borders, "which became its filter for narrating itself and the world"[53]—fortifying the delusion that Europe's contemporary racial condition emerges purely as the effect of an unforeseen intrusion of non-Europeans (migrants and refugees) arriving from outside, within a very shallow time horizon.

Europe's (collective) colonial history, of course, was an uneven one in which not all European nation-states were equal. Indeed, an essential feature of European history has always been the subjugation of some Europeans by others. Nonetheless, as Dace Dzenovska shows for Latvia, postsocialist eastern Europeans can be found aspiring "to overcome their seemingly permanent 'not-quite-European' position" by striving "to identify with colonialism" and reaffirming (western) Europe's colonial heritage.[54] In the context of contemporary European integration, this is symptomatic of what Aamir Mufti has tellingly designated the Europeanization of countries, such as Greece, that were precisely *not* colonial powers, which indeed were themselves variously dominated as colonies within Europe: "Entering into the European system, a society like Greece in effect becomes a former imperial metropole. . . . The immigration question throws a certain light on the Europeanization of Greece, which was obviously in many ways a society of 'the East' for centuries. . . . Like nationalism in an earlier era, Europeanism . . . too has the remarkable ability to erase the past."[55] In a manner that by now, fifteen years on, seems remarkably prescient, Balibar notably affirmed, "If Europe is for us first of all the name of an *unresolved political problem*, Greece [an ostensibly 'peripheral' country] is one of its centers . . . because of the current problems concentrated there."[56] Contemplating the more recent, specifically racial configuration of those problems, Mufti continues:

Greece reflects a truly EU phenomenon: these immigrants are trying to enter Europe as such, not necessarily Greece, which does not have any significant historical relations with their countries of origin. . . .

One of the most stunning features of the Greek economic crisis was the recurring threat of withdrawal of Europeanness. Expulsion from the Eurozone would be one marker of that, but there were other kinds of indicators as well. When Christine Lagarde compared Greece unfavorably with Niger . . . or when George Papandreou made the rather shameful and plaintive remark in October 2011 that "we are not, nor do we have any intention of becoming, India or Bangladesh" . . . something like the threat of the withdrawal of Europeanness was at stake. . . .

So it seems to me that in their systematic . . . beating and breaking of "black" and "brown" bodies, the gangs of Golden Dawn are making a strenuous case for the Greek people not being reduced themselves to a "black" or "brown" population.[57]

Notably, in Mufti's view the prospective "withdrawal of Europeanness" is tantamount to disqualification from whiteness.

The current crisis reveals the fissures and fractures of a postnational (European) union that has been deployed—always incompletely, but with partial success nevertheless—precisely to mask the real heterogeneity and inequality across Europe, in favor of a homogenizing Europeanization that promises to reconstitute a past prestige inseparable from empire.[58] Hence the profoundly postcolonial expression of migrant struggles in Europe—declaring, "We are here because you were there!"—remains enduringly poignant. Obviously, this riposte traditionally resonated most forcefully in the western European countries, especially Britain and France, owing to direct colonial linkages. Indeed, the postsocialist presence of Vietnamese and Mongolian migrants in eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, supplies a noteworthy counterpoint for further complicating the postcoloniality of Europe. Nevertheless, these postsocialist states' accession to EU membership and integration into the Schengen zone of free European mobility revealingly required the exclusion of those "non-European" migrants from eligibility for work visas.[59] As one border was lifted, another was reentrenched. Thus this timeworn postcolonial slogan of migrant struggles in Europe may seem increasingly anachronistic, but in fact it remains apt today—only the "here" that is invoked and the "you" to whom it is addressed have been Europeanized.

The crisis of that earlier (pre–Cold War) European community of colonial powers was set in motion by the forces of decolonization following World War II. Decolonization was itself a fundamental condition of possibility for the dynamics of bipolar fracture that prevailed during the Cold War.[60] Here, then, we must recall that the twentieth century was

inaugurated by Du Bois's famous proclamation of "the problem of the color line"[61] as the defining global fault line of the century.[62] Far less known, however, is Du Bois's contention (elsewhere) that "the *civilization* of the 20th century is European" (emphasis added).[63] Hence one could productively extrapolate that the problem of European civilization was precisely that nefarious problem of the color line. In the largely unknown early essay where he makes this claim, "The Spirit of Modern Europe," Du Bois's overall evaluation of European achievements is remarkably generous, even celebratory. Strategically, Du Bois sought to persuade his (specifically African American) audience that "after all America is not the centre of modern civilization."[64] Nonetheless, he affirms that Europe's modern achievements should be understood to be effectively global in configuration, referring provocatively to "that European civilization of which we all today form a part."[65] In ensuing years, nevertheless, as a premier postcolonial critic *avant la lettre*, Du Bois would more forcefully underscore how European power and prestige figured centrally in ordering a (modern, twentieth-century) world premised on "the divine right of white people to steal."[66] Confronting the new imperialism that had culminated in the ghastly carnage of World War I, Du Bois soberly declared: "We darker men say: This is not Europe gone mad; this is not aberration nor insanity; this *is* Europe."[67] Notably, Du Bois revisits the theme of the Europeanness of modern civilization four decades later, on the first page of *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept*, where he refers frankly to "the world-wide domination of white Europe" as "this European civilization [in the folds of which] I was born and shall die, imprisoned, conditioned, depressed, exalted and inspired. Integrally a part of it and yet, much more significant, one of its rejected parts."[68] Perhaps paradoxically, as the twentieth century ended and Du Bois's "problem of the color line" might have been naively expected to recede into history, our current century has been prominently distinguished by the fervent invention and fortification of a new border around the newly reunited Europe—a bordering that may be nothing less than yet another redrawing of the global color line and the institutionalization of what Balibar has tellingly suggested may be "a European 'apartheid.'"[69]

Perhaps still more paradoxical, European border policing has been increasingly externalized, so that presumed migrants are often apprehended and subjected to detention and deportation (sometimes multiple serial detentions and deportations) *before* they have ever crossed the territorial border of any European state, designated "illegal migrants" violating the borders of Europe without ever having set foot in Europe.[70] The European Union is exceptionally innovative in this regard, enlisting states as far removed as sub-Saharan Africa, and also beyond its eastern and southeastern borders, as junior partners deputized to police the effectively virtual

European border. Today, following decolonization for untold millions of people who were largely confined to the mass prison labor camps that were Europe's colonies, Europe is now confronted with migrants and refugees from those same countries. The dramatic escalation of migrant mobility in the late twentieth century, therefore, must be apprehensible as the historical successor to the mass global *im*mobilization of labor in Europe's colonies during the preceding era.[71] Inevitably, the global mobilization of migrants and refugees is likewise fueled by the colonial present and the unipolar military dominance of the United States as the historical successor of virtually all prior colonialisms.[72] Thus, facing the ever more bountiful harvest of empire, past and present, the mobility of most people from formerly colonized countries—indeed, the vast majority of humanity—is preemptively illegalized.

Indeed, the creation of a formalized European space of mobility, whereby EU citizens and residents may cross national borders without passport checks, has been largely reserved for Europeans only.[73] Here it is instructive to recall the migration regime that prevailed in much of western Europe between the devastation of World War II and the more recent era in which migrant "illegality" has proliferated. The era of guest worker recruitment first established frameworks for the importation of post/colonial labor for postwar reconstruction in Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Similarly, states without (or no longer in possession of) formal colonies—Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and, foremost among them, West Germany—imported contract labor from North Africa and above all Turkey but also recruited migrants among their poorer neighbors—from Portugal to Yugoslavia to Greece—precisely the debt-strangled, austerity-saddled countries that Srećko Horvat[74] has tellingly nominated the European South, evoking a lurid European avatar of the Global South. Importantly, the guest worker programs often provided for the continuous legalization of irregular migrants.[75] When that regime was terminated, a new regime premised on asylum effectively foreclosed almost all other routes for "legal" migration and required the great majority of migrants to refashion their mobility accordingly. Labor migration thereby assumed what was frequently the only permissible form, that of refugees fleeing persecution and seeking asylum. Predictably, the inevitable result was an ever increasing and more aggressive outcry against allegedly bogus asylum seekers. By the 1990s the increasingly integrated post–Cold War European asylum system had produced the material and practical conditions of possibility for illegalizing a burgeoning influx of migrants.[76] Alongside new policies of free movement for Europeans, furthermore, most of the "illegal" migrants now would inevitably be (nonwhite) non-Europeans.

Judging its real effects, therefore, the European asylum system is precisely *not* a system for granting asylum to refugees. It routinely has denied

the great majority recognition as legitimate asylum seekers and ordinarily has granted refugee status to fewer than 15 percent of applicants.[77] As a larger complex whole, the European asylum system is premised on a comprehensive suspicion of people seeking asylum and is effectively designed to disqualify as many applicants as possible, as allegedly bogus refugees. Certainly, there are commonly drastic differences in the application of asylum policy from one European country to another. However, the Dublin Accord, which legitimizes the routine expulsion of asylum seekers from the wealthiest western and northern European countries back to the first country where they were registered (in Europe's internal peripheries, the poorer eastern or southern border states), ensures that Europe, far from a refuge, becomes a space of rejection and marginalization for most asylum seekers. Hence a proliferation of those who seek asylum somewhere other than the first place where they were fingerprinted, as well as many others whose petitions for asylum have been rejected, find themselves in protracted and indefinite conditions of semi- or postlegality, if not outright illegality, and increasingly circulate within a European space of parallel ("irregular," unfree) mobility.[78] In terms of its real effects and what it actually produces, therefore, the European asylum system operates as a regime for the production of migrant illegality.[79]

Moreover, because the European asylum system maps roughly onto a divide between Europe and its exterior, illegalized migrants and rejected asylum seekers must frequently wear the border on their bodies: their racialization as anything deemed not white automatically signals their non-European (hence suspect) status. This racialized susceptibility to suspicion is also the foundation for the migrant's apprehension and susceptibility to detention—their detainability.[80] Consequently, many non-Europeans apprehended en route to European destinations are deprived of their liberty with no criminal charges, simply as an administrative measure, a problem of expedience.[81] Furthermore, many European countries as well as states subcontracted in Europe's expansive border zones increasingly charge unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers with criminal violations (and subject them to plainly punitive recriminations) on no other grounds than their noncitizen status, which is affiliated principally with the visible paraphernalia of their racialization as nonwhite (non-European).

Beyond their plainly punitive and cruel character, migrant detention and deportation, dramatically expanded and routinized, also expose the enormous investment of energy and resources for maintaining a European order partitioned by increasingly militarized or securitized borders. The regulation of borders is never merely a matter of exclusion, however. Detention camps obviously serve as extraterritorial dumping grounds for human beings deemed undesirable and out of place, sanitizing the official

borders that are supposed to verify a tidy sociopolitical order of European sovereignty. Nevertheless, what is less apparent is that many detention camps (so-called reception centers) are not closed prisons but, rather, provide a kind of solution for housing destitute, homeless migrants.[82] Furthermore, many (often the majority) of the migrants and refugees detained in such camps are in fact not deported but eventually released. Thus a key aspect of detention is the interruption and deceleration of the momentum of migrant mobilities, operating effectively as a disciplinary decompression valve for migrants' trajectories.[83] Hence migrants commence their more or less protracted apprenticeships as Europe's "irregular" labor force,[84] beginning of course with the severities and deprivations of illegalized border crossing itself, including various periods of being stranded in detention or elsewhere en route.[85]

The question of and about Europe, therefore, is ever increasingly fashioned against the postcolonial specter of a mob of mobile (nonwhite) non-Europeans.[86] This requires the ideological projection of a singular, unified Europe, which is after all a central project of the European Union itself. To underscore the formulation of the European question, I am consequently compelled to repeatedly invoke a notion of Europe in the singular, only then to persistently destabilize that same figure. Positing the European question requires an acute vigilance about defetishizing Europe as a reified monolith. Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli incisively caution against transposing the habits of methodological nationalism into an analogous (comparably uncritical) methodological Europeanism.[87] Furthermore, it is important not to collapse the concept of Europe into the European Union in an uncritical reflex of methodological EUropeanism. During the gradual accession of various eastern European states to EU membership, it has been abundantly clear that the (post–Cold War) project of European integration entails a pronouncedly differential layering of relative inclusion. The European Union's presumptuous civilizing mission, as depicted by Žižek with typically sardonic wit, consistently reaffirms "the patronising Western cliché which characterises the Eastern European post-communist countries as retarded poor cousins who will be admitted back into the family if they can behave properly."[88] From the Balkans to Chechnya, the anxious question about Europe's unstable boundaries is repeatedly re-posed—from within. In contrast, despite its campaign for admission to the European constellation, Turkey has remained resolutely beyond the pale: a defining (oriental) frontier. Nevertheless, the mere question of Turkish admission has had a significantly demoralizing effect on European confidence about the European Union. Notably, in exactly its capacity as European frontier, Turkey, along with countries on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, is a decisive holding area as a zone of migrant transit,[89] where—analogous to the detention

camps, but now writ large—human mobility is temporarily suspended and decelerated.

The diversity within the larger European constellation refers us again to profoundly uneven histories and the ways that the colonial projects of some European states often began at home with the subjugation of their European neighbors (or with the internal colonization of purportedly backward parts of their presumptive national territories).[90] Cold War legacies, furthermore, have ensured that many regions of the "East" of Europe largely remain a crucial reserve of migrant labor (both within and across the borders of EU citizenship and mobility). Therefore, if indeed Europe may be said to be a racial formation of postcolonial whiteness, this certainly does not mean that all Europeans are equally white, or white in the same ways. Like the racial formation of whiteness itself, the homogenizing character of a racial formation of Europeanness (or European whiteness) is precisely devoted to obfuscating and suturing what are otherwise profound and consequential differences and inequalities. "It is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false," David R. Roediger explains; "it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false. . . . Whiteness describes not a culture but precisely . . . the empty and therefore terrifying attempt to build an identity based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold back."[91] As with whiteness, so we may posit of Europeanness: it has historically acquired a spurious semblance of integrity or coherence solely based on its presumptive derision for and subjugation of whatever is produced as *non*-European. The constitutive contradictions and intrinsic antagonisms of Europeanness are precisely what the homogenizing racial formation of whiteness superintends and recodes. As Mufti notes so poignantly, regarding the fascist "gangs of Golden Dawn" in their frenzy of racist anti-immigrant violence: theirs is a strident, desperate plea "for the Greek people not being reduced themselves to a 'black' or 'brown' population."[92] Similarly, the Calabrian politician who, in the aftermath of the racist pogrom, proclaimed Rosarno the only remaining all-white town on Earth can be understood to have been making an agonistic plea for the beleaguered whiteness of the southern Italians themselves. As we learn from the history of the United States, such willingness to perpetrate (or at least collude with) racist terror has always been what James Baldwin famously depicted as the ultimate "price of the ticket" of inclusion into whiteness.[93]

Today, in the throes of economic crisis, coupled with the governmental impasse alternately designated a migrant crisis or refugee crisis, the fragility of the European Union in particular and the volatility of Europe more generally are plainly visible.[94] The European question, therefore, can serve as a crucial index for vital historiographical and ethnographic inquiry. Even as economists forecast the indisputable need for

more migrant labor in coming years to counteract the demographic trends of aging populations, migrant scapegoating and ever more hostile climates of immigration restriction have become standard features of the reactionary politics of misery and expanding precarity. Yet everywhere migrants are central to ongoing social and political redefinitions of European space and identity.

What, finally, is the future of Europe? How do competing European identity projects imagine the future? How are migrants' sociopolitical and spatial practices actively creating a new Europe and consolidating an alternative European future, despite escalating antagonism? Recalling the PIR in France, is "the worst" yet to come? Is it even conceivable that the future would *not* belong to the colonized natives of Europe, inheritors of all the colonial subjects who literally produced Europe's wealth, historically, and brought forth the postcolonial migrations that have already permanently and radically altered the social fabric of European life? The European question is as much about this struggle over the future as it is about accounting for the colonial past and postcolonial present. If we begin to formulate research in terms of these vital questions—from the critical vantage point of those conventionally produced as outsiders to Europe, in spite of their very substantive social locations *within* Europe—we may indeed initiate a dismantling of these sociopolitical processes as they take place in the present, in ongoing unresolved struggles, the stakes of which implicate us all.

Notes

to Tribunal 12, sponsored by the Swedish Forum for Human Rights (Stockholm, 12 May 2012), and to the London event of the TransEuropa Festival, organized by Alina Müller for European Alternatives (20 October 2013), where I had the good fortune of meeting Houria Bouteldja and first becoming acquainted with the vital political work of the Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR). Finally, I must express my special appreciation to Nahum Chandler, from whom I have learned, and continue to learn, so much about the enduring relevance of the thought of W. E. B. Du Bois for comprehending the problem of Europe.

1. Dubois, *Souls of Black Folk*, 43.

2. See Amin, "Multi-ethnicity and the Idea of Europe"; Gilroy, *"There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack"*; Mbembe, "Provincializing France?"

3. See Anidjar, "On the European Question"; and Paasi, "Europe as a Social Process and Discourse."

4. Adorno, "On the Question: 'What Is German?'" Remarkably, over three decades, no fewer than nine special issues of *New German Critique* (nos. 19–21, 38, 70, 80, 90, 96, 112) were dedicated to the question of post-Holocaust German identity.

5. Balibar, "Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa," 7.

6. Žižek and Horvat, *What Does Europe Want?*, 56, 91, 179. Cf. Žižek, "A Leftist Plea."

7. Habermas and Derrida, "February 15," 293.

8. Anderson, *Us and Them?*; Balibar, "Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa"; Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*; De Genova, "Migration and Race in Europe"; Fassin, "Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries"; Gullestad, "Invisible Fences"; Hervik, "Anthropological Perspectives"; Hervik, *Annoying Difference*; Huysmans, *Politics of Insecurity*; Modood and Werbner, *Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe*; Silverstein, "Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot"; Vertovec, "Cultural Politics of Nation and Migration."

9. See Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.*; Andrijasevic, "From Exception to Excess"; Bialasiewicz, "Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing"; Bredeloup, "Sahara Transit"; Carter and Merrill, "Bordering Humanism"; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles, "Stretching Borders beyond Sovereign Territories?"; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles, "Re-bordering the Neighbourhood"; Collyer, "In between Places"; Dzenovska, "Bordering Encounters"; Feldman, *Migration Apparatus*; Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas, "EU-Limboscapes"; Garelli and Tazzioli, "Arab Springs Making Space"; Hansen and Jonsson, "Demographic Colonialism"; Karakayali and Rigo, "Mapping the European Space of Circulation"; Rigo, "Citizens despite Borders"; Soto Bermant, "Consuming Europe"; Tazzioli, "Migration (in) Crisis"; Tazzioli, "'Which Europe?'"; Tsianos and Karakayali, "Transnational Migration"; van Houtum and Boedeltje, "Europe's Shame"; and Walters, "Europe's Borders."

10. Tazzioli, *Spaces of Governmentality*, 76; Tazzioli, "'Which Europe?'"

11. Bhambra, "Postcolonial Europe."

12. Balibar, "Europe as Borderland."

13. Mezzadra, "Anti-racist Research," citing Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*. See also Mbembe, "Provincializing France?"; Garelli and Tazzioli, "Arab Springs Making Space"; Garelli, Sossi, and Tazzioli, *Spaces in Migration*; Tazzioli, *Spaces of Governmentality*; and Tazzioli, "'Which Europe?'"

14. Balibar, "Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa"; Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*; De Genova, "Migration and Race in Europe"; Mbembe, "Provincializing France?"

15. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 324.

16. Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," 7.

17. Goldberg, *Threat of Race*, 335–36.

18. Ibid., 336.

19. Stoler, "Colonial Aphasia," 125.

20. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*.

21. Nahum D. Chandler proposes virtually the same questions about Europe (*Toward an African Future*, 51) in the context of asking: "What if a certain 'Europe' might come to imagine that one W. E. B. Du Bois—Negro, African, Afro-Caribbean, African American, Black, American, European American, White, European, etc.—is one of its most distinguished practitioners of thought?" (50).

22. See also ibid.; De Genova, "Stakes of an Anthropology"; and De Genova, "Migration and Race in Europe."

23. Quijano, "Coloniality of Power"; Dzenovska, "Historical Agency."

24. Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 38.

25. Mezzadra and Rahola, "Postcolonial Condition."

26. Hansen, "Post-national Europe."

27. Mezzadra and Rahola, "Postcolonial Condition."

28. Balibar, "Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa"; Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*; De Genova, "Migration and Race in Europe"; Gilroy, "'My Britain Is Fuck All'"; Gullestad, "Invisible Fences"; Hervik, "Anthropological Perspectives"; Hervik, *Annoying Difference*; Mezzadra, "Anti-racist Research"; Pred, *Even in Sweden*.

29. Essed and Trienekens, "'Who Wants to Feel White?'"; Knowles, "Landscape of Post-imperial Whiteness"; Mbembe, "Provincializing France?"; McDowell, "On the Significance of Being White"; Tyler, *Whiteness*.

30. Rushdie, "New Empire within Britain," 138. See also Gilroy, *"There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack,"* 11.

31. Hooper, "Southern Italian Town."

32. De Genova, "Spectacles of Migrant 'Illegality'"; Mbembe, "Provincializing France?"; Mezzadra, "Anti-racist Research."

33. De Genova, *Working the Boundaries*, 56–94.

34. See Mbembe, "Provincializing France?"; Merrill, "Who Gets to Be Italian?"; and Pettigrew, "Reactions toward the New Minorities."

35. Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*; Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 44. See also Balibar, "Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa."

36. Hervik and Meret, "Erostratus Unbound."

37. Titley, "They Called a War." See also De Genova, "Antiterrorism, Race, and the New Frontier."

38. De Genova, "Production of Culprits"; Huysmans, *Politics of Insecurity*.

39. Fekete, "Anti-Muslim Racism."

40. *Banlieue* is the French word for suburbs, which refers to poor or working-class suburbs peripheral to the gentrified center of the city and is conventionally associated with high concentrations of nonwhite people. Houria Bouteldja, "Islamophobia: When the Whites Lose Their Triple A Rating," www.decolonialtranslation.com/english/islamophobia-when-the-whites-lose-their-triple-a-rating.html (accessed 11 May 2016).

41. Anidjar, "On the European Question," 22–23. A focus on migration must therefore be complemented with critical attention to enduring legacies of anti-Semitism and especially anti-Roma racism. These internal (yet iconically mobile) figures of European alterity—Jews and "Gypsies"—continue to animate various revitalized projects of both European identity and European national identities as

racial formations. Indeed, the racial subjugation of the Roma increasingly merges this internal European dynamic with the problematic of transnational migration as such. As Liz Fekete notes, in the face of the newly reanimated pan-European racism against them, the Roma can only encounter Europe as something approximating "a huge open prison" ("Europe against the Roma," 68).

42. For an important examination of the Jewish question in Weimar Germany as inseparable from the figures of foreignness and migration, however, see Sammartino, "Deportation and the Failure of Foreigner Control."

43. Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims."

44. Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization," 346; Goldberg, *Threat of Race*, 66.

45. Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization"; Goldberg, *Threat of Race*, 151–98.

46. Public call made 16 January 2005: Mouvement des Indigènes de la République: "We Are the Indigenous of the French Republic!," www.decolonialtranslation .com/english/AppelEng.php (accessed 11 May 2016).

47. Bouteldja, "Mohamed Merah and I." See also Jansen, *Secularism*.

48. Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, "We Are the Indigenous of the French Republic!"

49. Mbembe, "Provincializing France?," 86.

50. Garavini, *After Empires*; Hansen, "'European Citizenship'"; Hansen and Jonsson, "Bringing Africa as a 'Dowry' to Europe"; Hansen and Jonsson, "Demographic Colonialism"; Hansen and Jonsson, "Statue to Nasser?"; Hansen and Jonsson, "Another Colonialism."

51. Du Bois, "Souls of White Folk"; Du Bois, "Of the Culture of White Folk"; Du Bois, *Darkwater*. See also Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*, 62.

52. Du Bois, "African Roots of War"; Du Bois, "Of the Culture of White Folk"; Du Bois, *Darkwater*; Orwell, "Not Counting Niggers."

53. Mbembe, "Provincializing France?," 90. See also Wilder, *French Imperial Nation-State*.

54. Dzenovska, "Historical Agency," 411.

55. Mufti, "Stathis Gourgouris Interviews Aamir Mufti."

56. Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 2.

57. Mufti, "Stathis Gourgouris Interviews Aamir Mufti."

58. Garavini, "Colonies Strike Back"; Garavini, *After Empires*; Hansen, "Postnational Europe."

59. Čaněk, "Social and Political Regulation."

60. Prashad, *Darker Nations*.

61. Du Bois, "Present Outlook," 95, par. 2, and 104, par. 19; cf. Du Bois, "Souls of White Folk," in *Darkwater*, 40.

62. Chandler, "Of Horizon"; Chandler, *Toward an African Future*; Chandler, "Introduction," 30–32.

63. Du Bois, *Problem of the Color Line*, 138, par. 7.

64. Du Bois, "Spirit of Modern Europe," 164, par. 27. See also Chandler, *X*, 225n42.

65. Du Bois, *Problem of the Color Line*, 172, par. 42.

66. Du Bois, "Souls of White Folk," in *Darkwater*, 48.

67. Du Bois, "Souls of White Folk," in *Darkwater*, 40. See also Du Bois, "Of the Culture of White Folk."

68. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 3.

69. Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 43–45. See also Carr, *Fortress Europe*; and van Houtum, "Human Blacklisting."

70. Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.*; Andrijasevic, "From Exception to Excess";

Bialasiewicz, "Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing"; Bredeloup, "Sahara Transit"; Heller and Pezzani, "Liquid Traces"; Karakayali and Rigo, "Mapping the European Space of Circulation"; Lecadet, "From Migrant Destitution to Self-Organization"; Levy, "Refugees, Europe, Camps/State of Exception"; Tsianos and Karakayali, "Transnational Migration."

71. De Genova, "Deportation Regime," 54.

72. De Genova, "Stakes of an Anthropology"; De Genova, "Antiterrorism, Race, and the New Frontier."

73. Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 47; Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*; Carr, *Fortress Europe*; Feldman, *Migration Apparatus*; van Houtum and Pijpers, "European Union as a Gated Community."

74. Žižek and Horvat, *What Does Europe Want?*, 157.

75. Castles, "Guestworkers in Europe."

76. Karakayali and Rigo, "Mapping the European Space of Circulation." See also Hansen, "Post-national Europe."

77. The preenlargement European Union (EU-15) recognition rate for full refugee status was only 15 percent in 2001 (Hatton and Williamson, "Refugees," 10). In 2012 (in the extended aftermath of the Arab Spring and ongoing civil wars in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, alongside political turmoil in Eritrea), in the enlarged EU-27 first-instance refugee recognition was only 14 percent, with 73 percent of all asylum applications rejected outright (Eurostat, "Asylum in the EU27").

78. Rigo, "Citizens despite Borders."

79. De Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality'"; De Genova, *Working the Boundaries*, 213–49.

80. De Genova, "Production of Culprits."

81. In 2006 there were at least 130 detention centers in the twenty-five EU member states (European Parliament, "Conditions in Centres"). The actual number now is undoubtedly much higher, especially considering European border interdictions beyond the limits of territorial Europe. See Carter and Merrill, "Bordering Humanism"; and Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas, "EU-Limboscapes."

82. Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.*, 177–207; Leerkes and Broeders, "Deportable and Not So Deportable."

83. Mezzadra, "Anti-racist Research," par. 19. See also Andrijasevic, "From Exception to Excess," 158–59; Karakayali and Rigo, "Mapping the European Space of Circulation," 133–34; and Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, *Escape Routes*, 196–202.

84. See De Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality,'" 429.

85. See Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.*; Collyer, "In between Places"; Collyer, "Stranded Migrants"; Dowd, "Trapped in Transit"; Lecadet, "From Migrant Destitution to Self-Organization"; and Tazzioli, "Migration (in) Crisis."

86. See Aradau and Huysmans, "Mobilising (Global) Democracy"; and Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, *Escape Routes*, 42–82.

87. Garelli and Tazzioli, "Migration Discipline Hijacked," 300.

88. Žižek and Horvat, *What Does Europe Want?*, 52.

89. Düvell, "Turkey"; Osseiran, "Making Time at the Frontiers of Europe."

90. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*. See also Bhambra, "Postcolonial Europe"; and Mellino, "Italy and Postcolonial Studies."

91. Roediger, *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness*, 13.

92. Mufti, "Stathis Gourgouris Interviews Aamir Mufti."

93. Baldwin, *Price of the Ticket*.

94. De Genova and Tazzioli, *Europe/Crisis*.

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